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[L. A. No. 21455. In Bank. Oct. 17. lO!iO.] 
ERNST KRAMER et al.. Petitioners, v. SUPEHIOR COURT 
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Re~pol1dent. , . 
11 J Decedents' Esta tes-Distribution-Oertiorari.-Ceriiorari is 
proper to Tevipw an order denying a motion, nnder Corle Civ. 
Proe., § 473, to set aside a decree of distribution of an estate, 
sinee such orddr is nonappealable. but rp.lief can be grantP-d 
only if the probate court exceeded its jurisdietion in denying 
the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1068.) 
[2] Id.-Distribution-Certiorari.-Certiorari does not lie if the 
only excess of jurisdiction alleged relates to insufficiency of 
evidence, and in such a proceeding the probate eourt's OTder 
denying a motion under Code Civ. Proc., § 473, to set aside 
a de~e of distribution will not be reviewed, where the court 
acted in the light of faets alleged in affidavits to constitute 
miStake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neg1ech and it is 
not alleged that the court's action was on a ground not author-
ized by statute. 
PROCEEDING in certiorari to annul an order denying 
a motion to set aSide a judgment decreeing distribution of 
an estate. Order affirmed. 
[1} See 4 Cal.Jur. ]028: 10 Am.Jur. 524. 
lI/[cK. Dil. B.eference: [1,2J J.)cceU"uLIi' i:::;LuLel;, 11075.1. 
},>; 
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E!Jlmet B. Bays for Petitioners. 
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General. and William J. Power,.-
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. ..C. 
SHENK, .l.-This is a proceeding in certiorari to annul an'i~ 
order denying a motion to set aside the decree of distributioJl f; . 
in the matter of the estate \)f Bruno M. Kramer, deceased,:: 
The petitioners are nationals and residents of Germany. . ... ' 
Tbe decedent died in Los Angeles County on March' 12,'~ 
1948. The estate consisted entirely of community real and,~; 
personal property. It was converted to liquid assets, and the; 
residue after specific beqnests and charges of administration~ 
amounted to approximately $60,000, By his will, admitted to 
probate on April 20, 1948, the decedent left one-half of the 
residue to his deceased wife and tbe other balf to bis own 
named relatives residing in eastern Germany. ._. 
The rigbts of the petitioners to take under the w)11 are J 
governed by the following provisions of section 259 of the '1 
Probate Code: ,1 
"The rigbt of aliens not residing within the United States' 
. • . to take real property in this State by succession or tes-
tam~tary 1iisposition,-upon-"the-same--"ferms' andeonoitio 
as residents and citizens of the United States is dependent· 
in each case upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the 
part of citizens of the United States to take real property . 
upon the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens 
of the respective countries of which such aliens are residents 
and the right of aliens not residing in the United States . . • 
to take personal property in this State by succession or tes-
tamentary disposition, upon the same terms and conditions as 
residents and citizens of the United States is dependent in 
each ease upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the 
part of citizens of the United States to take personal property 
upon the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens 
of the respective countries of which such aliens are residents. " 
Section 259.1 provides that the burden is upon the non-
!resident aliens to establish the fact of existence of the recip-
Irocal rights. Section 259.2 states that if such reciprocal rights 
are not found to exist and if no heirs other than such aliens 
are found eligible to take the property, it shall be disposed 
of as escheated property. 
The constitutional validity of the foregoing provisions. 
applicable 88 of the date of thc decedent'8 death, has been 
) 
) 
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upheld. (Olark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 [67 S.Ct. 1431,91 L.Ed. 
1633,170 A.L.R. 953] ; Estate of Knutzen, 31 Cal.2d 573 [191 
P.2d 747]; Estate of Bevilacqua, 31 Ca1.2d 580 [191 P.2d 
'152].) These cases also establish that it is proper in a probate 
proceeding to determine the rights of nonresident aliens to 
take under the testamentary dillposition. 
None of the German legatees appeared in tbe probate pro-
ceeding. In the pE.'tition fOT diRtribution filed on January 
,18, ]949, the executor alleged that no "rE.'ciprocal agreement" 
existed between the United States and Germany, and distri-
bution was requested pursmmt to section 259.2 of the Probate 
Code. On March 10, 1949, the court found in accordance with 
the executor's allegations and ordered distribution to the 
wife's heirs of one-balf of the portion of tbe residue left to 
the German legatees and the other one-half to the State of 
California. 
There was no appeal from the decree. Witbin six months 
after entry, on September 2, 1949, tbe petitioners moved 
pursuant to section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set 
aside the decree as having been taken against them tbrough 
their mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusablE.' neglect. The 
factors bearing on these elements were averred to be Jack of 
knowledg¢ by the netitioners other than tbat they were resid-
uary legatees, and of surprise that the executor would take 
a position contrary to their interests; also lack of knowledge 
that they would be required to prove tbe reciprocal rights of 
German citizens residing abroad wbich tbe state's representa-
tive admits, at least as to realty, were incorporat('d in an 
existing treaty betwe('n the United States and Germany. (See 
Clark v. Allen, supra, 331 U.S. 503.) 'J!here was no averment 
that the notices required by law were not given, or were not 
received in sufficient time to make an appearance, or to par-
ticipate in the probate proceeding, or to take an appeal from 
the decree of distribution. Tbe statement of fact in that 
respect is that the notices required by law were not sent to 
tbe addresses specified in the will, nor to the actual addresses 
of the residuary legatees, but to addresses supplied from some 
unknown and unauthorized source. In regard to the time 
element, distance was also relied on. 
[1] Since the order denying the motion was nonappeal-
able, the petitioners were in position to invoke the remedy 
afforded by the present proceeding. (Prob. Code. ~ 1240; 
Howard v. Superior Court, 25 Ca1.2d 784, 787 [154 P.2d Si9] ; 
• C.Jd-4 
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Lindead v. Superior Court, 17 CaJ.App.2d 9, 1'1 [61 P 
355].) But the relief sought could be granted only if it 
shown that the probate court in denying the motion to 
aside the decree exceeded its jurisdiction. (Code Civ. 
§ 1068; and cases hereinafter cited.) Under the Allt'ht\,·,t 
herein cited the probate court has jurisdiction to entertain 
motion and to grant or deny the application in the pXF'rlli'''':~ 
of its aiscretionary power. (Prob. Code, § 1233; Code Ci 
Proc., § 473.) 
It has been pointed out that on appeals from orders IIIl 
section 473 the courts have been favorably disposed 
action on the part of the trial courts which would r~1 
from default and permit, rather t.han prevent, the adjudica- ' 
tion of controversies on their merits; and that orders grant~ 
ing relief have rarely been reversed and then ouly for an';~ 
abuse of discretion. (Benjamin v. Dalmo Mfg. Co .• 31 Ca1.2<1: 
523, 525 [190 P.2d 593], and cases cited; see also Reidy v.; 
Scott, 53 Cal. 69; M1tchell v. California etc. S. S. Co., 15G."cal.' 
576 [105 P. 590], and Brasher v. White, 53 Cal.App. 54~' 
[200 P. 657], where on appeal orders denying relief wer( 
reversed.) [2] In addition it is well settled that certiorarf 
will not lie where the only excess of jurisdiction alJegell relatE'S' 
j to insufficiency of the evidence. (Estate of Kay, 30 Cat2.: 
215, 218 [181 P.2d 1]; Howard v. Superior Court, supra. 25 
Cal.2d at 789.) Here the probate court acted on the moti ' , 
in the light of the facts stated in the affidavitR elaimed to{ 
('onstitutt> mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excnsAblE' nc~lect.' 
Tnose statements comprised the evidence upon which the court'· 
based its order denying the motion. What the result might be: 
on an appeal from such an order, or whether the decree of' 
distribution might have been reversed on appeal if one bad, 
been taken, or what might be the equitable considerations in;; 
a proper action attacking the decree on available grounds, or: 
what might be the result in an escheat proceeding, are not. 
questions properly presented in this proceeding. The deter-, 
minative factor here is that no reviewable basis is presented 
,in the attack upon the probate court's exercise of its judicial: 
,power. It cannot be said that the court lacked jurisdiction, 
to make the order based on the evidence before it and there 
is no contention that the court's action was on a ground not 
authorized by statute. 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Oct. 1950] KRAMER tJ. SUPERIOR COURT 
136 C.2d 1119;122 P.2d 874J 
163 
THAYNOR, J.-I concur in the conclusion that certiorari 
clolls not lie to review the propriety of the order denying the 
motion to set aside the decree of distribution. A motion to 
flrt IIside a judgment under section 473 is addressed to the 
soulld discretion of the trial court and "it need bardly be 
8cillf'd that on certiorari we do not review matters within the 
disc'rrtion of the lower court." (E.date of Kay, 30 Ca1.2d 
215,226 [181 P.2d 1] ; Howard v. Superior Court, 25 Ca1.2d 
184.789 [154 P.2d 849] ; Spanaclt v. Superior Court, 4 Ca1.2d 
44i, 450 [50 P.2d 444}.) 
It is contended, bowever, that the decree of distribution must 
br I';l't aside regardless of the adequacy of petitioners' show-
ing elf mistake, inadvertence, or surprise. for tbe reason that 
flll' probate court bad no jurisdiction to enter such a decree. 
'j'hns, pt'titioners do not attack merely the order denying their 
lIlotion under section 473; they invokf' the writ of certiorari 
to !;upport a collat.eral attack upon thf' df'cree of distribution. 
Crrtiorari will not lie for that purpose. for the probate court 
hud jurisdiction to enter the decree and petitioners had a 
r('l1ledy by appeal. 
Thf' decree of distribution erroneously excluded petitioners 
from obtaining the· real property under the will of decedent. 
'1'111' decree was appealable, however, and petjtiont'r~ ''eould 
IIII\'(' secured its reversal bad they taken a timf'ly appeal. 
(Hsfofe of Knutzen, 31 Ca1.2d 573, 577 [191 P.2d 7471: Estate 
of Rrl!ilacqtta, 31 Ca1.2d 580, 582 [191 P .2d 7521.) Certiorari 
will not lie when a remedy by appeal has bf'en lost by the 
failure of the aggrieved party to avail bims(>!f of the remedy 
within the time permitted. (Phelan v. Superio,. C01lrt, 35 
ral.2d 363, 370 [217 P.2d 951J.) 
Moreover; certiorari will not lie to annul a decref' of a 
/'ourt of competent jurisdiction for errors of fact or law in 
tIJI' entry of that decree. If the trial court has jurisdiction 
to determine a particular issue, it is not deprived of juris-
diction by an erroneous determination. The error must be 
assrrted on appeal and not by petition for certiorari. (Abe.l1e.ira 
v. Di.~trict Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 287 fl09 P.2d· 
942, 132 A.L.R. 7151; Brock v. Superior CfJ1lrt. 29 Cal.2d 
629, 637 [177 P.2d 273, 170 A.L.R. 521J; E.~fafe of Kay, 30 
Ca1.2d 215, 219, 220 {181 P.2d 1].) In thf' present casf'. the 
probate court bad jurisdiction with respf'ct to its drcrf'f' of 
distribution to determine the persons ('ntit!(>d to decedent's 
property under the will and the hlws of thil'O statf'. Tts o('(lree 
Was erroneous because of its failure to take judicial notice 
) 
) 
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of the 1923 treaty between Germany and the United 
which created the reciprocal rights of inheritance ...... n"'i.~ ... 
by Probate Code, section 259. Failure to take judicial 
is error that may be ass£'l'ted on appeal, but it is not 
dictional. Certiorari is not a substitute for appeal. (B 
v. Supertor Court, 25 Cal.2d 784, 787 1154 P.2d 849].) 
will not lie "where the only excess of power complained 
is the entering of an order unsupported by evidence" or u_ ..... ·_ 
on an error of law. (Estate of Kay, 30 Ca1.2d 215, 219 I 
P.2d 1] ; Abclleira v. DtStrict Court of Appeal, supra; 
ard v. Superior Court, supra, 789; Brock v. Superior 
8upra.) , 
The result of the decree of distribution is that petitioners " 
are deprived of a share in the estate of decedent to which thcy • 
were clearly entitled. The decree has become final, however. 
and is res judicata. Petitioners in' effect contend that the 
doctrine of res judicata must be disregarded because of 
they consider to be inequities arising out of the ""y·nn,l>nnt." 
decree of distribution. Such a departure from res judicata 
throws into question the finality of any judgment and thus', 
is bound to cause infinitely more injustice in the long run thaD', ' 
it can eonc£'ivably avert in this case. I therefore concur" 
the affirmance of the order. 
CARTER, J .-1 dissent. 
In this case a resident and citizen of this country died, 
testate leaving property situated in this state to German na- , 
tionals. The estate consisted in part of real property. The 
decr~e of distribution did not distribute any of the property 
to the alien devisees. They sought relief from that decree 
by motion under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
Such relief was denied. As no appeal lies from the order of 
denial it can be reviewed as to "jurisdictional" questions 
by certiorari, and that is the present proceeding. 
The majority hold that the denial order cannot be annulled 
because the court bad jurisdiction under section 473 to con-. 
sider and determine factual matters such as surprise, inadver- i 
tence, and excusable neglect. At least as to the real property ; 
there were no factual matters to be determined. The status' 
of the aliens as such, and as devisees, is not disputed; nor is' 
it disputed that a portion of the estate consisted of real 
property. If there existed an applicable treaty between 
Germany and this country it is controlling, regardless of 
section 259 of th£' Probate Code. There did exist sucb • 
treaty covering real property, and, as said in EstG'. _I I • .,. 
) 
) 
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,,.n. 31 Ca\'2d 573, 577 [191 P.2d 747], when declaring the 
Jaw 8S announced by the United States Supreme Court in 
elm'/r v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 [67 8.Ot. 1431, 91 L.Ed. 1633, 
170 A.L.R. 953] : "The nonresident alien heirs were entitled 
tl1I.d/!r the treaty to sell the realty and withdraw the proceeds, 
and it is immaterial that the property was sold by the admin-
h;trl1lor. apparently to get funds to pay debts and expenses, 
illslc'ocl flf by those heirs. In either event, they were entitled 
til Khare in the proceed.~ of the realty. and the Alien Property 
Custodian was entitled to claim their shares by reason of the 
Vl'st ing order." (Emphasis added.) 
'1'111' existence and terms of the treaty need not be pro"en. 
'I'h(' probate court was bound to take judicial notice therf:'oi'. 
()ur statute provides: ., Conrts take judicial notice of the 
following facts: . . . (3) Public and private official acts of the 
ll'yislative, exec1ttive and judicial departments of this state 
and of tlte United States, and the laws of the several states 
of the United States and the interpretation thereof by the 
bigbest courts of appellate jurisdiction of such states," (em-
phasis added) (Code Civ. Proc., § 1875 (3» and the authori-
ties hold that courts take judicial notice of treaties. (See eases 
t'olIrcted, Wigmore on Evidence, (3d ed.) vol. IX, § 2573, 
p.556.) It is clear, there~ore, that the court had no discrf:'tion 
hut to grant relief, for it had rendered a decree of distribution 
('ontl'sry to the treaty-the supreme law of the land. A tr(>8ty 
is on a par with the Constitution as being the supreme law of 
the IlInd. 
The question is, therefore, whether an order may be 
annulled on certiorari which, on undisputed facts, is squarely 
euntrary to constitutional mandate. In my opinion there can 
be no doubt about it. It is said in Rescue Army v. Municipal 
Court, 28 Ca1.2d 460, 462 [171 P.2d 8]: "The constitution-
ality of a statute or ordinance may be tested by prohibition 
on the ground that invalidity of the legislation goes to the 
jurisdiction of the court to proceed to try the ease. (See 
Whitney v. Superior Oourt, 182 Cal. 114 [187 P. 12]; Levy 
v. Superior Oourt, 105 Cal. 600 [38 P. 965, 29 L.R.A.811]; 
Arfsten v. Superior Oourt, 20 Cal.App. 269, 275 [128 P. 949J; 
c/. Broady v. Jennings, 70 Cal.App. 647 [234 P. 120J.) This 
rule is supported by the great weight of authority in other 
states. (See cases collected in 113 A.L.R. 796, 800; 42 Am. 
Jur.168.) The same principle has been applied in cases where 
habeas corpus has been used to test the constitutionality of 
